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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

*

Case No. 920078

v.

:

Priority No. 13

VENUS ANN SHERARD,

:

Petitioner•

i

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The questions presented for review are:
1. Was the court of appeals obligated to consider, for
the first time on appeal, the merits of petitioner's challenge to
the adequacy of the voir dire concerning the prospective jurors'
knowledge of the victim's family?
2.

Did the court of appeals properly conclude that the

trial court's limitation of voir dire questions, concerning the
prospective jurors' personal use of alcohol, did not curtail
counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory challenges or
to detect juror bias?
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is State v.
Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1991), in which rehearing was
denied on December 6, 1991.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of
the court of appeals by a writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1991).

Respondent agrees that the

instant petition was timely filed under rule 48(a) and (c), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of any constitutional provisions, statutes
and rules upon which respondent relies is included in the body of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1987, petitioner, Venus Sherard, killed Ruby Kelly
by stabbing her nine times with a knife during a street fight in
front of twenty to thirty people (T. 146-49, 197-202, 221, 251,
298-301, 321-326, 355-56, 383, 415-18, 523-24, 567-68).

In 1989,

petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990)
(R. 245). Petitioner was sentenced to the statutory term of
imprisonment and timely appealed (R. 252, 254).
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

See

State v, Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1991) (attached as
Addendum A).

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, to which

the State was ordered to respond in part.

The petition was

denied (Order attached as Addendum B).
The facts surrounding the murder are accurately stated
in the opinion of the court of appeals.
556.

Sherard, 818 P.2d at

Since the petition for writ of certiorari is limited to the

adequacy of the jury voir dire, only facts relevant to those

2

issues will be discussed.1
Petitioner was originally arrested on May 7, 1987 for
Ruby Kelly's murder (R. 3, 15-16).

Because several of the

victim's relatives witnessed the stabbing, there were some
initial concerns that a confrontation might result if petitioner
was released from custody (R. 272 at 23-24, 29). But even
petitioner's trial counsel recognized that this did not amount to
"the kind of threat where people are going to drive themselves
crazy trying to find her.

We think it's more of a confrontation

or immediate threat were she to have contact with these people or
be easily available to them.

We don't think physical harm is, or

physical threat is going to be great in that situation" (R. 272
at 29). Petitioner was released pretrial in September, 1987 (R.
42-43).

Three months later, petitioner violated the terms of the

release and a bench warrant issued for her arrest.

She was re-

arrested in September, 1988 (R. 63-64, 71, 74). There is no
evidence that any threats or confrontations occurred during the
intervening period.

Nor, is there any record support that the

1987 pretrial concerns for petitioner's safety existed in 1988,

1

Despite petitioner's determination to only challenge the
adequacy of the jury voir dire, she attempts to reargue the facts
supporting her conviction by alleging: "The Sherard opinion is
irreconcilable with the record in respect to the events transpiring
immediately prior to the first and second fights between Ruby Kelly
and Venus Sherard." See Petition for Certiorari at 3. See also
Petition at 2-4, for similar allegations. These characterizations
of the facts should be disregarded as irrelevant to any arguments
advanced in seeking certiorari.
3

at the time of her re-arrest, or 1989, the date of trial.2
Prior to her original trial date in 1987, petitioner
filed a motion for counsel-conducted voir dire (R. 22). The
motion was denied "without prejudice" but never renewed (Supp. R.
272 at 19). After her re-arrest and prior to the 1989 trial,
petitioner filed thirty-four (34) requests for jury voir dire
questions (R. 97-103).

Pertinent to the pending petition,

petitioner initially requested:
18. Do you know the alleged victim in this
case, Ruby Kelly or her close friends or
family? How do you know them? Have any of
them ever discussed this case with you?
19. Do you know the defendant, VENUS ANN
SHERARD, or her family or close friends? How
do you know them? Have any of them ever
discussed this charge with you?
20. Do you know any of the witnesses listed
in this case? How do you know them? Have
they ever discussed this matter with you? If
the witness you know were to testify, would
you be inclined to believe that person
because of your knowledge about them?
(R. 99). Four days later, petitioner withdrew these questions

2

Petitioner asserts that the case was difficult to
investigate because the victim's "associates were threatening the
witnesses." See Petition for Certiorari at 3. Petitioner then
footnotes the statement to refer to the trial court's single
admonition to the audience during trial to be quiet (R. 466) as
being an example of how "people extraneous to the actual trial may
have attempted to influence . . . the trial." See Petition for
Certiorari at 3 n.l.
Both statements are distortions of the
record. One officer testified that some of the witnesses, many of
whom were gang members or relatives of gang members, were
"hesitant" to talk to the police (T. 110). Similarly, the court's
admonition to the audience to be quiet was not directed at any
specific individuals but simply exemplified "that many in the
courtroom are emotionally committed to the effects of this offense
from whichever side they may come"(R. 631).
4

and substituted the following, in pertinent part:
1. Do any of you know the defendant VENUS
SHERARD, her family, or Ruby Kelly's family?
2. Do any of you know of the defendant,
VENUS SHERARD, her family or Ruby Kelly's
family through your family or friends?
(R. 160).3
As petitioner conceded on appeal (Br. of Appellant at
19-23), the trial court conducted an extensive voir dire.

The

questioning substantially incorporated petitioner's requests as
well as sua sponte inquiries.

It primarily involved in-court

examination but included in-chamber inquiries as required or as
requested by any potential juror (T. 3-68).

All of petitioner's

challenges for cause were granted by the court (T. 61-68).
Relative to petitioner's proposed questions concerning
knowledge of the victim or her family, the court asked counsel to
introduce themselves, petitioner, and their respective witnesses
(T. 16-17).

Among the witnesses were Vikki Salazar, the victim's

cousin (T. 18-19, 455), Vikki's brother, Jeff Salazar,
presumptively another cousin of the victim's (T. 16-18, 283), and
Vikki's nephew, Todd Kingston, presumptively a second cousin of
the victim's (T. 16-18, 339). The court asked if any of the jury
panel were "acquainted" with these witnesses (T. 17). None of

3

On appeal, petitioner characterized these proposed questions
as "concerning the relationships
or contact
between prospective
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family." See Br. of Appellant at 19 and
Petition for Certiorari at 11 (emphasis added). While the court of
appeals
incorporated
that
language,
a
more
accurate
characterization of the questions is that they concerned the
prospective jurors' knowledge of the victim and her relatives.

5

the jurors indicated that they were (T. 19). The panel was asked
if they were "familiar" with the victim, Ruby Kelly.

Again, all

responded negatively (T. 21).
Despite these direct questions and unanimously negative
responses, a potential juror, Manuel Martinez, subsequently
approached the court because he thought he "may be familiar with
some of the parties in this case" (T. 58). Mr. Martinez was then
questioned in-chambers.

He admitted that while he had previously

denied being "acquainted" or "familiar" with the witnesses and
victim, he was actually "real good friends" with Anthony and Max
Kelly, two of Ruby's brothers, and that his wife's sister-in-law
was Vikki Salazar (T. 58-59).

The court removed Mr. Martinez for

cause (T. 62, 64-65).A
No further requests concerning the potential jurors'
knowledge of the victim and her family were made; nor, were any
exceptions taken to the scope of the inquiries made in this
regard (T. 65-67).

Based on the record, the court of appeals

concluded that petitioner had failed to properly preserve the
issue for appeal.

Sherard. 818 P.2d at 558.

Petitioner also attacks the court of appeals' review of
the trial court's limitation on voir dire questions concerning
the potential jurors' personal consumption of alcohol.
A

Pretrial,

Again, petitioner attempts to distort this incident by
characterizing it as "[a]n additional incident [which] brought the
threat posed by the Kellys to the trial court's attention." See
Petition for Certiorari at 6. There is no record support for the
claim (T. 58-59).
All that the incident demonstrates is the
obvious problem which exists in any voir dire if potential jurors
are not honest and candid in their responses.
6

petitioner requested that the jurors be asked:
30. Are there any of you who do not
drink alcoholic beverages? If so, have you
ever drunk alcoholic beverages in the past?
For those who do not drink alcoholic
beverages, do you believe it is wrong for
moral or religious reasons? Would testimony
that a person was drinking in this case cause
you to feel less favorable about that
person's credibility?
(R. 102-03).

During the voir dire, the trial court inquired:

There may be evidence during the course of
this case that there were alcoholic beverages
being consumed by the defendant, the victim
and maybe others in their surroundings. Do
any of you believe that it is simply morally
wrong to consume alcoholic beverages in all
cases and under all circumstances, if so ,
would you raise your hand?
(T. 38). The court also asked the jurors if there existed any
undisclosed factors which could impact their verdicts (T. 67).
To both questions, the court received negative responses (T. 38,
67).

At the close of voir dire, petitioner's trial counsel

requested that the jurors be asked "whether the alcohol is drunk
by members of the jury as a practice" (T. 66). The court
declined to so inquire.
On appeal, petitioner claimed that the trial court's
failure to ask about the personal consumption practices of the
jury panel constituted an abuse of discretion.

The court of

appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the voir dire,
when taken as a whole, adequately allowed for the detection of
bias and the intelligent use of peremptory challenges.
818 P.2d at 559.

7

Sherard,

ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DECLINED TO
ADDRESS, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL,
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE VOIR DIRE
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE JURORS' KNOWLEDGE OF
THE VICTIM'S RELATIVES.
Petitioner concedes that she did not take exception or
otherwise object at trial to any claimed deficiencies in the voir
dire concerning the potential jurors' knowledge of the victim's
relatives.

See Petition for Certiorari at 11. Despite this,

petitioner asserts

that the court of appeals improperly applied

civil procedure cases in determining waiver and impermissibly
failed to rule on petitioner's "plain error" argument.

Neither

contention provides a basis for proper certiorari review.
An appellate court "need not analyze and address in
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and
properly before [it]. Rather, it is a maxim of appellate review
that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate
court is largely discretionary with that court."
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989).

State v.

Further, a written

opinion need not "'set forth and dispose of, seriatim, each and
every item which appellant's counsel chooses to characterize as
an 'issue' in the case.'" Id. (quoting People v. Roias, 118 Cal.
App. 3d 278, 290, 174 Cal. Rptr. 91, 92-93 (Cal. App. 1981)).
Consistent with the established rule, the court of appeals did
not directly respond to petitioner's argument that her failure to
object below would not preclude appellate review under a "plain

8

error11 analysis.

For, the "plain error" doctrine does not

mandate an appellate court to consider any issue which has not
been properly preserved.
(Utah 1990).
discretion

State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29

Instead, an appellate court may exercise its

to correct a trial court error, despite a lack of

objection, where the error is both obvious and harmful.

State v.

Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62
(1989).

Here, petitioner thoroughly briefed and orally argued

the merits of her "plain error" argument to the court of appeals.
Under these circumstances, the court's omission of the argument
from its written opinion implicitly demonstrates the court's
conclusion that no plain and prejudicial error existed.

As to

the first prong of "obviousness," petitioner did not establish
why it was not reasonable for the trial court to assume that it
had covered the scope of defendant's request when it asked the
jurors if they were "acquainted" with witnesses, who in fact were
relatives of the victim, and asked if they were "familiar" with
the victim, especially where other names of relatives were
supplied to the trial court and no exceptions taken to the scope
of the questions asked.

Regarding the second prong of

"prejudice," petitioner has never alleged that any relative of
the victim sat on the jury empaneled.

See Utah R. Crim. P.

18(e)(3) (allowing a challenge for cause to be predicated on
"consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured").

Without a showing that one of the

jurors who adjudicated petitioner's case could have been removed

9

for cause, prejudicial error may not be found•

Mu'Min v.

Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991) (peremptory challenges are
not required by the federal constitution); State v. Gotschall,
782 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1989) (prejudicial error may occur if a
party is forced to "exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror who should have been removed for
cause").

Accord State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)

(even where a voir dire issue has been preserved, "an appellant
has the burden of establishing that reversible error resulted
from an abuse of discretion").
Petitioner's second contention is that the court of
appeals improperly relied on civil rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of criminal rules, in concluding that petitioner had
failed to preserve the voir dire issue.
Certiorari at 12.

See Petition for

However, it is clear from the opinion that

the court relied on the principles exemplified in rule 20, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require a party in a criminal
case to timely state its objections to any actions of the trial
court.

Sherard, 818 P.2d at 558. This is consistent with rule

18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which specifies that
any challenge to a prospective juror "may be made only before the
jury is sworn to action."

It is also consistent with the clear

rulings of this Court that a party in a criminal case has the
obligation to timely object to the adequacy of the voir dire in a
manner calculated to inform the trial court of the error and to
permit any appropriate correction.

10

State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d

81, 83 (Utah 1988) (ruling that to preserve voir dire issues, a
defendant must timely object under rule 18 or face waiver on
appeal under rule 12); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah
1988) (under rules 18 and 12, defendant's failure to challenge a
prospective juror or request further inquiry into her alleged
bias constituted waiver which could not be "attributable to the
trial court's failure to do so of its own accord"); State v.
Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (failure to follow
procedural requirement of lodging challenge before jury is sworn
constituted waiver); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah
1983) (even when the court "forgets" to ask an otherwise proper
voir dire question concerning bias, failure to conform to rule 18
by

"object[ing], remind[ing] the judge of the oversight,

mak[ing] a new request, [or] ask[ing] permission personally to
voir dire the jury" constituted waiver under rule 12). Accord
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Apps. 1989), cert, denied,
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (failure to ask an otherwise proper
voir dire question constitutes waiver under the general
procedural requirement that "to preserve a question for appeal,
an objection must be clear and concise and made in 'a fashion
calculated to obtain a ruling thereon'"); Broberg v. Hess, 782
P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) ("[a] specific objection to the
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry is required so that
the trial court may correct its error before the jury is selected
and empaneled;" thus, more is required to preserve the issue than
merely filing pretrial written voir dire requests).
11

See also

Keller v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1948)
("whenever a litigant has a meritorious proposition of law which
he is seriously pressing upon the attention of the trial court,
he should raise that point in such clear and simple language that
the trial court may not misunderstand it, and if his point is so
obscurely hinted at that the trial court quite excusably may fail
to grasp it, it will avail naught to disturb the judgment on
appeal")•
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
IN LIMITING VOIR DIRE INQUIRY
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION PRACTICES
JURORS•

CONCLUDED THAT
ITS DISCRETION
INTO THE
OF POTENTIAL

Petitioner argues that the court of appeals erroneously
concluded that no error occurred when the trial court declined to
inquire into the personal alcohol consumption practices of the
individual potential jurors.

Petitioner asserts that this

Court's opinion in State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984)
mandates a contrary conclusion.
The Sherard decision is consistent with recent
pronouncements of this Court and the federal supreme court.
While a trial court has the responsibility of seating a fair and
impartial jury, "a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its
sound discretion.

This is the rule in civil cases, and the same

rule must be applied in criminal cases."
S. Ct. at 1903-04 (citations omitted).

12

Mu'min v. Virginia, 111

Applying this logic, this

Court has similarly concluded:
[N]o specific form of questioning need be
followed in order for the voir dire to give a
defendant his or her rights due under the
constitution. The constitution does not
require that jurors be questioned
individually, by counsel in the case, or in
any other particular arrangement. The manner
and method of voir dire lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).

Accord Bishop, 753

P.2d at 448 (the test is whether, given the totality of the voir
dire questioning, "counsel was afforded an adequate opportunity
to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors").
Here, petitioner has not advanced any basis from which
to conclude that the issue of alcohol would bear in anyway on the
ultimate issues at trial. While the stabbing occurred at a party
where drinking was generally occurring, neither petitioner nor
the witnesses testified that the use of alcohol contributed to
the fight.

Nor was petitioner's use of alcohol argued as a basis

to negate her intent or to otherwise minimize her culpability.
Instead, the issue at trial was whether the nine stab wounds
inflicted by petitioner were done in self-defense or with
homicidal intent.

Under these circumstances, Ball is not

factually dispositive.

Instead, the court of appeals properly

concluded that general references to the consumption of alcohol
by a defendant or witness, do not establish a sufficient basis to
justify "'an inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences
of a venireman.''

Sherard, 818 P.2d at 559 (quoting State v.

Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060).

As such, the trial court had not abused

13

its discretion in limiting inquiry beyond that of the jurors'
general attitudes toward the consumption of alcohol.

Sherard,

818 P.2d at 559.
CONCLUSION
Having failed to present any appropriate basis for
certiorari review, the petition should be denied.
*>

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
-->

IRlSTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief in opposition to petition for writ of certiorari
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Joan C. Watt & Elizabeth
Holbrookf attorney for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

^ c i a y of March, 1992./] [

I

^

V&A e^v^t^H rr^ )

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

reWfr«r:u\v.'ii

PILED

| ^ ,

C

.LP 10 1991

IN TH^TAH^^URtvOF- APPEALS
T.Noonan
Cterk of the Court
Utah Coim of Appeal

ooOoo

OPINION
(For Publication)

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No- 890383-CA

v.
Venus Ann Sherard,

F I L E D
(September 10, 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, and Elizabeth
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
RUSSON, Judge:
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction of criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We affirm.
FACTS
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v. Pascual. 804 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah App.
1991).
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 7, 1987, Sherard,
with friends, went to a party at Vikki Salazar's home. The
party had started around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived, about
thirty to forty people were present, most of whom were drinking
A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby Kelly, the
victim in this case, arrived at the party with two friends,

Kristi Bray and Tanya Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but
did know Benns, who was a member of a rival gang. Benns began
arguing with Sherard and others, and in response, Salazar
asked Kelly and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's
protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead.
When Sherard reached the front yard of Salazar's house,
she met one of her friends whose face was bloody. The friend
said that Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said that
she wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight broke out
between the two women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard walked away, Benns
taunted her to continue the fight. According to one witness,
Eloy Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard asked him for
a knife, which he gave her. Additionally, at least two
witnesses heard someone shout that Sherard had a knife; another
testified that he actually saw the knife in Sherard's hand.
Sherard testified that Esquibel put "something" into her hand,
which she did not look at, but believed was a knife.
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed, moving into the
street. According to several witnesses, Sherard delivered
several uppercuts to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness
to the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with
the knife in her hand. Todd Kingston, another witness to the
fight, testified that after the fight he took a knife from
Sherard and threw it away; several other witnesses saw him do
so. Additionally, Tommy Quintana, a friend of Sherard,
testified that Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly.
Kelly died from nine stab wounds.
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of
murder in the second degree. Sherard appeals that conviction,
raising the following four points: (1) Was there sufficient
evidence presented at trial to sustain her conviction for
murder in the second degree? (2) Did the trial court abuse its
discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective
jurors? (3) Did the trial court properly deny her request for
a jury instruction on negligent homicide? (4) Did the trial
court commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury
on self-defense and mutual combat?
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Sherard argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the second

o

degree.
On appeal, we review the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict. State v. Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989)
(citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we substitute our own
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the
jury. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); £££
alSP State v, Lactod. 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1988). On
appeal, we will reverse only if the evidence "is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt1' that the defendant
committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v.
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted);
£££ also Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,
903-04 (Utah App. 1990).
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another panel of
this court clarified our marshaling requirement and applied it
to criminal jury trials. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39
(Utah App. 1990). Moore held that in order for an appellant's
sufficiency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the merits,
the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
jury's verdict and demonstrate that, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict below.
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled the
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor shown that, in
spite of this evidence, the verdict below is unsupportable.
Appellant's brief contains no references whatsoever to the
evidence presented at trial. In an apparent effort to respond
to the marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply brief
contains a matrix that lists various witnesses and their
testimony on a number of issues. However, upon examination,
this matrix amounts to no more than an outline of transcript
citations. The reply brief contains no indication as to what
evidence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence opposes
it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the chart. Nor does
the reply brief contain any argument as to why the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case. In
other words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record for
us to review for sufficiency.
However, since Moore. by its own terms, is meant to apply
only prospectively, i£l. at 739, and since this appeal was filed
prior to the court's decision in Moore, we review Sherard's
sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits.

The jury was instructed on second degree murder as follows:
Before you can convict the defendant,
Venus Ann Sherard, of the crime of Criminal
Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree, as
charged in the Information on file in this
case, you must find from all of the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of
the following elements of that offense.
1. That on or about the 7th day of
March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard,
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and
2. That said defendant then and
there did so: (a) intentionally or
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another, she
committed an act clearly dangerous to human
life; or (c) knowingly acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, she engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk [of]
death to another;
3. That said defendant caused the
death in an unlawful manner and without
justification.
If you are convinced of the truth of
each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty of the
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
Second Degree as charged in the Information.
If, on the other hand, you find that
the State has failed to prove any of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you
must find the defendant not guilty.
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is sufficiently
conclusive to support the said verdict. As to the first
element, all witnesses* accounts of the fight support the
conclusion that Sherard caused the death of Kelly. As to the
second element, Sherard's own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave
her something -heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like
metal or something,M which she believed was a knife, and that
she punched Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the
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very least, a depraved indifference to human life. This
conclusion is further supported by the testimony of numerous
witnesses who recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy
Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him for a knife before
resuming the fight, and various witnesses' accounts of the
second fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that he
actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a knife in her hand.
As to the third element, although Sherard testified that she
acted in self-defense, several witnesses testified that Sherard
returned to Kelly and, without justification, resumed the
fight. Given the amount of evidence which supports the State's
case, we cannot say that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that Sherard was guilty of second degree
murder, and therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict.
II.

VOIR DIRE

Sherard next claims that the trial court erred in limiting
the voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, she
objects to the extent of the trial court's inquiry as to:
(1) the relationship or contact between prospective jurors and
Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliations, (3) experience
with and attitude toward alcohol, (4) experience with and
attitude toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity.
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a challenge for
cause and to assist counsel in the intelligent use of
peremptory challenges. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah
App.), cert, granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State vt
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983) and Hornsby v.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah
App.), cert* denied Siih nom. Hornsbv v. LPS Church. 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire is within the discretion
of the trial judge, as long as counsel is given adequate
information with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id.
Moreover, "whether the judge has abused that discretion is
determined, not by considering isolated questions, but
•considering the totality of the questioning.'" Xd. at 457-58
(quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)).
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning the
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby
Kelly's family, was not properly preserved for appeal. When
asked to pass the jury for cause, defense counsel objected to

the omission of several requested areas of inquiry, including
the other matters raised on appeal herein. However, defense
counsel did not object to the lack of inquiry into the
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby
Kelly's family. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 provides
that counsel -state his objections to the actions of the court
and the reasons therefor.- See also Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d at
458. Since defense counsel failed to do so as to this issue,
it was not properly preserved for appeal.
Sherard1s second claim of inadequate voir dire, group
affiliations of the prospective jurors, also fails. The two
requested questions in this area that were not asked by the
trial court were:
Do you belong to any clubs or
organizations? Which ones?
What kinds of hobbies and leisure time
activities do you enjoy?
On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of inquiry would have
revealed whether potential jurors could relate to the lifestyle
of gang members or find such lifestyle opprobrious. However,
she fails to support this blanket claim with any argument or
analysis as to how either of the requested questions is
probative of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle of
gang members. Moreover, this was never given as a reason for
requesting these questions below. Since the trial courts have
been instructed not to allow -inordinately extensive or
unfocused questioning,- id. at 457, we find no abuse of
discretion on behalf of the trial court in refusing to ask
these questions either.
On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked the
potential jurors:
There may be evidence during the course
of this case that there were alcoholic
beverages being consumed by the
defendant, the victim and maybe others in
their surroundings. Do any of you
believe that it is simply morally wrong
to consume alcoholic beverages in all
cases and under all circumstances, if so,
would you raise your hand?

£

There were no affirmative responses to this question. Sherard
claims that this question was insufficient because it failed to
address potential jurors* attitudes toward and experiences with
alcohol. As to the former, we are of the opinion that this is
precisely the sort of question which is designed to elicit
potential jurors' attitudes toward alcohol. As to the latter,
it is the trial court's duty to "protect juror privacy." State
v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is
the trial court's duty to forbid defense counsel to "conduct an
inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences of a
venireman." Ifl. On the facts of this case, it was sufficient
for the trial court to inquire on the attitudes of the
potential jurors as to alcohol, without specifically inquiring
as to their experiences with it. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion on this matter.
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadequacy of
investigation into the potential jurors' experiences with and
attitudes toward violence. With respect to this issue, the
trial court asked four questions: "[H]ave any of you been
involved in a fist fight before?"; "Have any of you been in a
fist fight or in a fight where weapons have been used?";
"[Have] any of you [] been witnesses to a serious injury as a
result of a fight involving weapons . . . ?"; and "Do any of
you believe that there is no circumstance or that it is morally
wrong to be in a fight at all situations . . . ?" Taken as a
whole, these questions were designed to and did elicit
responses on the prospective jurors' experiences with and
attitudes toward violence. Thus, the trial court's refusal to
inquire further was not an abuse of discretion.
The final issue with regard to voir dire is Sherard's
claim that the jurors were not adequately questioned as to
their exposure to publicity. The judge conducted the following
inquiry:
Have any of you heard anything about this
case, if so, would you raise your hand?
You can say yes or no to the question.
Have you heard about this case?

All right. Would your familiarity with
the reporting cause you any reason to

believe you could not be fair and
impartial in this case?

If you read something in the newspaper
would you be caused to believe that this
would be true simply because it's in the
newspaper?

If you heard testimony here in conflict
with that which you read in the newspaper
would you be willing to follow that which
you believed from the courtroom that you
heard in testimony rather than that which
you read in the newspaper?
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial publicity concerns
the court's failure to ask about specific magazines which the
jurors read or to which they subscribed. However, defense
counsel presented no argument to connect specific magazines
with pre-trial publicity below, nor does counsel present such
argument here. It is abundantly clear that the questions
asked, in fact, revealed more about jurors' familiarity with
pre-trial publicity than a vague question about specific
magazines subscribed to and read could possibly have elicited.
Therefore, again we find no abuse of discretion..
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to limit voir
dire did not prevent detection of bias, nor did it limit
defense counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory
challenges. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the
limitation of voir dire by the trial court in this case.
III.

NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

Sherard next asserts that the trial court erred in failing
to give her requested jury instruction on negligent homicide.
We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested
instruction under a correction of error standard, granting no
particular deference to the trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn
v. Department of Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert.
denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon v. Farr, 770
P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 19t9)).

Although "a defendant's requested lesser included offense
must be given when there is some evidence which supports the
theory asserted by defendant,H State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d
254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,
157-59 (Utah 1983)), there must also be a w•rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting [her] of the included offense.•" State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (quotingfiflJifiJL,671 P.2d at
159). Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is sufficient
evidence to support Sherard1s request for a negligent homicide
instruction, and (2) whether there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting Sherard of murder in the second degree and
manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed, but still
convicting her of negligent homicide.
Negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter are related
concepts, both requiring that defendants conduct be M, a gross
deviation1 from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary
person.- Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. The only difference is
that manslaughter requires that the defendant was actually
aware of the risk of death, while in negligent homicide, the
defendant was not, but should have been aware of such risk.
I£. (citing Boooess v. State. 655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
Our review of the evidence indicates that Sherard1s
request for a negligent homicide instruction is unsupportable.
Sherard's own testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her
something "heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like metal
or something," which she believed was a knife, and that she
punched Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after the
fight, she told Tommy Quintana, "I stabbed her, I think I
stabbed her." This testimony is inconsistent with negligent
manslaughter's requirement that the defendant be unaware of the
risks associated with her conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no
evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was unaware
of the risks involved. Without such evidence, we cannot
justify an instruction on negligent homicide.
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Sherard of the
greater offense, second degree murder. We, therefore, find
that there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting
Sherard of second degree murder and manslaughter and convicting
her of negligent homicide.

Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court, on similar
facts, held that -since the jury convicted of second degree
murder despite the fact that an instruction was given on the
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a
negligent homicide instruction was, at very best, harmless
error.- Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267, Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the
jury on negligent homicide.
IV.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Sherard also contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in instructing the jury on self-defense and
mutual combat. Specifically, she argues that one of the
instructions concerning self-defense erroneously stated that
the test of the reasonableness of her actions was an objective,
not subjective, test; and that the mutual combat instruction
was irrelevant and confusing.
-[B]eyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity
of the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.- State v.
M y / 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
However, the said instructions must not incorrectly or
misleadingly state material rules of law. IdSherard argues that Jury Instruction Number 26 erroneously
stated that self-defense is governed by an objective, not
subjective, standard. Instruction Number 26 reads:
The reasonableness of a belief that
a person is justified in using force that
would cause death or serious bodily injury
against another shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under
the then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 1991) provides that,
in order to successfully assert a claim of self-defense, a
defendant must -reasonably believef] that such force is
necessary to defend [herself] . . . against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force." We have previously stated
that reasonable in the context of section 76-2-402(1) means
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-objectively reasonable.- State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah
1987)). This instruction plainly complies with the objective
standard requirement; therefore, the trial court did not err in
giving the said instruction.
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual combat^
instruction that was given was irrelevant and confusing. The
instruction in question, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides:
If you find that either party was a
party to mutual combat, or other consensual
altercation, and that during the course of
the combat or altercation, either party
used a deadly weapon, then you must not
consider the consent of the victim in the
encounter as a defense to the crime of
Criminal Homicide.
Almost every account of the fight between Sherard and
Kelly indicates that it was, indeed, mutual combat. It was
therefore entirely appropriate for the trial court to clarify
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had mutually agreed
to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard*s use of a deadly
weapon in that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed as
the initial aggressor. See state v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90
(Utah 1981) and cases cited therein. Since the precise wording
of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, Lopez. 789 P.2d at 45, we hold that it was proper
for the trial court to give the mutual combat instruction in
question.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to sustain Sherard's conviction for
murder in the second degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective
jurors; (3) the trial court properly denied defendant's request
for a jury instruction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial

court did not err in instructing the jury on self-defense and
mutual combat. Accordingly, we affirm.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAlk™"*™^ ^ F A P P E A L S
ooOoo

* S t a t e of Utah,

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890383-CA

v.
Venus Ann Sherard,
Defendant and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed September 30, 1991, and
appellee's Response to Petition for Rehearing, filed
October 24, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated t h i s

P

FOR THE COURT:

Clerk\fof''the Court

day of December, 1 9 9 1 .

